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Robert E. Baldwin 
1.1  New Analytical Developments and the Need for Empirical Analyses 
Increased interest in U.S. trade policy, stimulated by  such factors 
as the massive U.S.  trade deficit, a belief that intervention by foreign 
governments in international markets has given other countries a com- 
petitive edge over the United States, and concern about the increase 
in  protection  among industrial countries, has led to major analytical 
developments in  international  economics in  recent years. The most 
important of these is the so-called new trade theory that emphasizes 
imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale in contrast to the 
traditional  assumptions of perfect competition  and constant returns. 
With this new framework it is possible to show that governments can 
sometimes “create”  comparative advantages for their countries by 
exploiting market imperfections and scale economies. Furthermore, by 
introducing  appropriate trade  taxes  or subsidies, governments can 
sometimes raise domestic welfare by shifting excess oligopolistic profits 
from foreign to domestic firms. 
Another major development is the broadening of  the scope of  inter- 
national economics to include the study of the political and economic 
factors shaping trade policy decisions by governments. By modeling 
the public  choice process, economists are able to better understand 
not  only  why  it is  often  very  difficult  politically  to introduce trade 
measures that they believe will raise national welfare but why policies 
that they think will reduce national welfare are sometimes implemented. 
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As  is the case with the traditional competitive framework, a wide 
range of economic outcomes is possible in both imperfectly competitive 
and public choice models. Which outcomes are most likely under var- 
ious conditions can only be determined by careful empirical, institu- 
tional,  and  historical  analyses  of  relevant  cases  and  events. 
Unfortunately, such studies do not exist in sufficient numbers to draw 
many general conclusions, due to the long-standing lack of interest by 
economists in trade policy matters and the newness of the imperfectly 
competitive and public choice approaches. The purpose of this volume 
is to help correct this state of affairs by analyzing various trade policy 
issues not only theoretically but in empirical, institutional, and histor- 
ical terms.  It contains the papers presented at a National Bureau of 
Economic Research conference on Trade Policy Issues and Empirical 
Analysis, which took place in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on February 
13-14,  1987. Most of  the comments of the discussants of  the papers 
are also included. The conference was one of a series being held as 
part of NBER’s trade relations project, which is financed by the Ford 
Foundation. 
The volume is divided into four parts. The four chapters in part I, 
“Measuring Trade Policy Effects under Imperfectly Competitive Mar- 
ket Conditions,”  empirically assess the economic impact of  various 
trade policies introduced in  industries where the “new”  trade theory 
seems to apply. Part 11, “Measuring the Economic Effects of  Protec- 
tion,” contains two chapters that attempt to isolate the effects of pro- 
tection from the influences of the many other economic changes that 
accompany actual periods of protection and one chapter that examines 
how  the effects  of  exogenous changes in  economic conditions vary 
depending on the form of protection. The chapter in part 111, “Deter- 
mining the Relationship between  Foreign Direct Investment and Ex- 
ports,’’ provides new empirical evidence on the issue of the effect of 
foreign production by a country’s firms on the home country’s exports. 
In part IV, “Assessing U.S. Bilateral Trade Policy Disputes,” two key 
bilateral issues are analyzed, namely, recent US.-Japanese trade ten- 
sions and the incident involving the threat of the imposition of  coun- 
tervailing duties by the United States on Canadian softwood lumber. 
The latter chapter adopts an explicit political economy framework. 
1.2  Measuring Trade Policy Effects under Imperfect Competition 
The first chapter in part  I, “Empirics  of  Taxes on  Differentiated 
Products: The Case of Tariffs in the U.S. Automobile Industry,”  by 
James Levinsohn, focuses on the trade and domestic production effects 
of imposing a tariff on a subset of a group of differentiated products, 
in particular, automobiles imported from only one country or only small 3  Introduction 
cars rather than all cars. To deal with the problem of estimating own- 
and  cross-price elasticities of  demand  for over a hundred  different 
models of available cars, most of  which are available for only a few 
years, Levinsohn adopts a Lancasterian characteristic approach to de- 
termine  which  multidimensionally differentiated  automobiles closely 
compete with each other, that is, which are neighbors. This technique 
makes the estimation problem tractable, since the cross-price effects 
of non-neighbors are assumed to be zero. 
The resulting list of neighbors for the various models is quite rea- 
sonable and the derived demand elasticities are both reasonable and 
statistically significant. Levinsohn’s calculations indicate, for example, 
that a I  percent increase in the price of imported Japanese automobiles 
leads to a .I87 percent rise in the demand for domestically produced 
autos and a .393 percent and .300 percent rise in the demand for im- 
ported  German and Swedish cars, respectively.  In contrast, he esti- 
mates that  a  1  percent  rise in  the price of  all  imported cars would 
stimulate a .367 percent increase in U.S. auto production. 
Richard Baldwin and Paul Krugman empirically model international 
competition in the market for large commercial jet aircraft in chapter 3, 
“Industrial  Policy and International Competition in Wide-Bodied Jet 
Aircraft .” The aircraft industry is technology-intensive, involving large 
initial development expenses as periodic fundamental breakthroughs in 
design are made. There are significant reductions in production costs as 
experience with new technology is gained. A special feature of the me- 
dium-range, wide-bodied aircraft sector on which the authors focus is 
that one of the two suppliers, Airbus, is a consortium jointly owned and 
heavily subsidized by four European governments. The authors’ main 
aims, using the simulation model they develop, are to reproduce the 
competitive conflict between Airbus and the U.S. supplier of such air- 
craft, Boeing, and to estimate the magnitude of the actual subsidy re- 
ceived by Airbus and its effect on welfare in the United States, Europe, 
and the rest of the world. 
The authors model international  competition between  Boeing and 
Airbus  as a  Cournot duopoly  situation in  which the willingness of 
European governments to subsidize Airbus enables this firm to use a 
zero discount rate in calculating its optimum output path, in contrast 
to a 5 percent rate for Boeing. Relying on various industry studies for 
estimates of initial setup costs, the elasticity of the learning curve, the 
price elasticity of demand for the aircraft, and other needed parameters, 
Baldwin and Krugman first calibrate the model to a base period  in 
which the price of the aircraft and the market shares of the two pro- 
ducers are known and then simulate the behavior of prices and market 
shares thereafter. They also simulate a scenario in which the European 
countries do not subsidize production and Boeing is the only producer 4  Robert E. Baldwin 
throughout the period. Their basic result is that the subsidized entry 
of Airbus cost Europe about $1.5 billion and reduced Boeing’s potential 
profits significantly. The early market entry of the aircraft due to the 
existence of Airbus also brought significant consumer benefits to all, 
although not enough to offset the loss in producer surplus in the United 
States. 
In chapter 4,  “Strategic Models, Market Structure, and State Trad- 
ing: An Application to Agriculture,”  Marie Thursby considers the op- 
timum role for government trade policy in  a  situation in  which  two 
countries, one represented by a marketing board that maximizes joint 
producer returns and the other by one or more private firms that max- 
imize profits, compete in exporting a homogeneous agricultural product 
to a third country. Both countries consume the product themselves but 
do not export to each other’s domestic market. This framework fits 
the stylized role of Canada and the United States in the world wheat 
market. 
Thursby finds that optimal trade policy differs depending  on whether 
the marketing agent maximizes producer returns or profits only if  the 
government with the marketing board regulates the domestic price of 
the commodity. In particular, an export tax might be the optimal policy 
for the government of the country with a regulated marketing board, 
whereas an export subsidy is always the optimal policy for a govern- 
ment when the country’s exports are controlled by a private, profit- 
maximizing monopolist. If the private export industry is composed of 
more than one firm, however, an export tax also might be optimal for 
this government. 
Using the ability to price-discriminate between export and domestic 
markets as  an indicator of market power, Thursby empirically analyzes 
the relationship between differences in U.S.  export and domestic prices 
of grains and volumes of U.S. exports of these commodities (a positive 
relationship indicates the existence of market power); she concludes 
that, except in the case of wheat, there is no evidence of the exercise 
of monopoly power by U.S. exporters. This suggests that the appro- 
priate strategic grains policy for the U.S.  government would be export 
taxes. 
Surprisingly little work has been done in applying the “new”  trade 
theory to developing countries. Yet, as  Dani Rodrik points out in chap- 
ter 5, “Imperfect Competition, Scale Economies, and Trade Policy in 
Developing Countries,” available evidence on concentration ratios and 
scale economies suggests that the imperfect competition framework is 
even more germane for developing countries than developed economies. 
Rodrik first develops a general equilibrium framework for assessing 
the benefits and losses from partial trade liberalization by developing 
countries in  which he shows the potential clash between  pulling re- 5  Introduction 
sources out of protected sectors and expanding firm output in industries 
with significant scale economies. He then simulates the effect of  lib- 
eralizing imports in  three typical  developing-country  industries, au- 
tomobiles, tires, and electrical appliances, in order to assess the relative 
importance of these two conflicting forces. His conclusion is that the 
levels  of  protection  observed  in  the manufacturing  sectors of  most 
developing countries greatly exceed any that can be justified  by  the 
presence of imperfect competition. He stresses, however, that the op- 
timal pattern of liberalization under imperfectly competitive conditions 
is likely to be quite different from what one might anticipate on the 
basis of intuition deriving from the competitive paradigm. 
1.3  Measuring the Economic Effects of  Protection 
In measuring differences in the degree of openness among countries, 
economists are hampered  by  the difficulty of  quantifying the many 
nontariff trade barriers presently restricting international trade. Edward 
Learner in chapter 6, “Measures of Openness,” which is the first essay 
in part 11, tries to overcome this problem by using data on supplies of 
productive resources and distances to markets to explain the observed 
degree of  a country’s openness and then by taking the difference be- 
tween the degree of openness predicted by the model and the actual 
degree of  openness as a measure of the effects of a country’s trade 
barriers. 
Utilizing 1982 trade data for 183 three-digit Standard International 
Trade Classification (SITC) commodities covering sixty-five countries, 
he  estimates both  a factor-analytic model with  resources  treated  as 
unobserved variables and a model with measured values for the re- 
sources. The factor-analytic model fits the observed data quite well, 
and an examination by  country of  the commodities contributing the 
most to the absolute residuals suggests that they can be explained by 
reasons other than trade barriers.  Rather than concluding that trade 
barriers are not an important impediment to openness, Learner con- 
cludes that the technique itself is seriously flawed because only pe- 
culiarities in a country’s trade in comparison with the trade of others 
can give rise to the result that barriers are important. For example, if 
all countries protect to the same degree, the technique will  not pick 
up any of the restrictive effects of these barriers. 
The model based on measured  values for resources is not open to 
the same criticism, but  its relatively poor fit suggests that there are 
important omitted variables.  An examination of the individual items 
contributing the most to the residuals reinforces the view that omitted 
variables  are the  major explanation why  most  items appear on the 
list. Learner, consequently, is pessimistic about the ability of residual 6  Robert E. Baldwin 
techniques to capture the effects of trade  barriers on the degree of 
openness among countries. 
Chapter 7, by Robert Baldwin and Richard Green, “The Effects of 
Protection on Domestic Output,” attempts to measure the degree to 
which import protection stimulates domestic output and employment 
levels in the protected industries. After reviewing various theoretical 
reasons why protection may be less effective than policymakers might 
expect, the authors review reports of  the International Trade Com- 
mission (ITC) evaluating industry requests for the extension of import 
protection and then undertake an econometric analysis of  the effec- 
tiveness of protection. 
The ITC documents  several instances  where  protection has ‘been 
undermined because of various unanticipated  responses by  suppliers 
and consumers. Country-specific protection granted the color television 
and nonrubber footwear industries, for example, was rendered inef- 
fective by an increase in imports from noncontrolled suppliers. Quality 
upgrading, modifications in the product in order to qualify for a different 
tariff classification, and shifts by consumers to substitute products have 
also caused protection to be ineffective in various cases. 
Using data for five industries at the four-digit SITC level over the 
period 1972-82, the econometric analysis utilizes a vector autogression 
model to test the hypothesis that a change in the level of protection 
does not “Granger cause”  a change in the level of  domestic output. 
In only one industry, footwear, are the results inconsistent with this 
hypothesis. 
Rather  than  assessing the effects of  different forms of  protection 
introduced because of an increase in imports, Val  Lambson, in chapter 
8, “Trade Restraints, Intermediate Goods, and World Market Condi- 
tions,”  explores the effects of  changes in economic conditions once 
protective policies are in  place. In particular, using a general equilib- 
rium model with intermediate goods, he contrasts the effects of  a change 
in a country’s terms of trade on domestic prices, factor use, and con- 
sumption when protection is provided, alternatively, by tariffs, by quo- 
tas, and by  domestic content requirements in either physical or value 
terms. 
Lambson finds that world and domestic prices of  inputs move to- 
gether when a tariff is in place, whereas under a quota a change in the 
world input price has no effect on its domestic price. With a domestic 
content requirement expressed in physical terms, the two prices are 
negatively correlated. The sign of  the relationship when the domestic 
content requirement is stated in  value terms is ambiguous. Lambson 
illustrates the possible magnitude of these various effects with a simple 
simulation exercise. 7  Introduction 
1.4  Measuring the Effects of Foreign Direct Investment on Exports 
As Magnus Blomstrom, Robert Lipsey, and Ksenia Kulchycky note 
in  chapter 9,  “U.S. and Swedish  Direct  Investment and  Exports,” 
which makes up part 111 of the volume, the effect of the foreign pro- 
duction associated with foreign direct investment on the investing coun- 
try’s exports is still not fully settled, despite a considerable amount of 
previous  empirical  research.  Policy  proposals to hinder  foreign  in- 
vestment out of concern that domestic  jobs are lost by the substitution 
of foreign production for domestic production  are still frequently put 
forth. A difficulty with all empirical studies of this issue is the likelihood 
that the variables determining investment and affiliate production in a 
country are the same ones determining trade flows. The authors attempt 
to overcome this  simultaneity problem by using  changes in  exports 
rather than export levels, since it seems likely that the most trouble- 
some unaccounted-for  factors simultaneously influencing investment 
and exports do not determine changes in exports. 
Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Kulchycky find that the higher the level of 
Swedish affiliate production in a country, the higher the level of Swedish 
exports to that country and that industry. Their results based on U.S. 
data are more mixed,  however.  At the most  disaggregated industry 
level there is a preponderance of positive relationships between affiliate 
net sales and U.S. exports, but there are a few negative relationships, 
implying  some  substitution  between  affiliate  production  and  U.S. 
exports. 
1.5  Assessing U.S. Bilateral Trade Policy Disputes 
In  “United States-Japan  Economic Relations,”  chapter 10 in  part 
IV, Rachel McCulloch reexamines the main sources of economic fric- 
tion between the United States and Japan and evaluates their signifi- 
cance in affecting current and future relations between the two countries. 
She concludes that the major source of friction, the huge Japanese 
export surplus with the United States, has been caused by a mismatch 
of  macroeconomic policies  and conditions in  the two countries, in 
particular,  U.S. fiscal  policies  that have  produced the large  federal 
budget deficit, the increased attractiveness of U.S. investments to for- 
eigners  coupled  with  the reduced appeal  of  foreign  investments to 
Americans, and the liberalization  of Japanese restrictions  on capital 
outflows. 
As McCulloch points out, the econometric evidence on whether Ja- 
pan’s low import share, especially in  manufacturing,  is due to trade 
barriers is conflicting. Some investigators of this issue find that Japan’s 8  Robert E. Baldwin 
trade is adequately explained by the same basic determinants that ex- 
plain the trade of other countries; others find the opposite result, which 
they attribute to hidden import barriers. Even the latter group agrees, 
however, that removing the barriers is unlikely to have a major effect 
in reducing the overall trade imbalance. 
McCulloch notes that the catch-up phase in Japan’s technological 
knowledge has been completed and that, as the United States and Japan 
continue to become more similar in terms of technology base, capital, 
and labor skills, intra-industry trade is likely to grow significantly. She 
argues that sectoral trade conflicts will continue, however, as the two 
countries pursue different approaches to phasing out declining indus- 
tries and nurturing new ones. 
The final, very interesting chapter in the volume is by Joseph Kalt. 
As the title,  “The  Political  Economy  of  Protectionism:  Tariffs and 
Retaliation in the Timber Industry,” indicates, Kalt uses a public choice 
perspective to analyze a major trade dispute between Canada and the 
United States. The incident involved preliminary findings, by the U.S. 
Commerce Department and the International Trade Commission, that 
Canada was subsidizing exports of softwood timber and that this was 
causing material injury  to U.S.  softwood  lumber producers.  It was 
highly likely that these findings would be confirmed in the final decisions 
of these organizations and that a 15 percent countervailing duty against 
Canadian softwood lumber exports would be imposed. But after high- 
level political efforts to contain the dispute, Canada agreed to impose 
a 15 percent duty on softwood lumber exports to the United States in 
return for the U.S. lumber industry’s dropping the case. 
Kalt finds that the actions of the U.S. lumber industry fit the “cap- 
ture”  theory of  policy-making very  well.  The industry  was able to 
organize effectively, produce well-reasoned technical and legal docu- 
ments for the relevant government agencies, and enlist congressional 
support for its appeals  to the White  House.  The Canadian lumber 
industry and the Canadian government objected vigorously to the pend- 
ing imposition  of  countervailing duties but  eventually accepted  the 
export tax compromise, a solution that, by Kalt’s calculations, actually 
increases Canada’s national welfare on balance. He finds the paths that 
protectionism took in this case to be sobering. The United States was 
not pursuing a strategic policy to improve welfare but was pushed into 
protection by powerful domestic political interests and then had to find 
a way to halt the threat of a trade war by appeasing the affected foreign 
country. 